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This article is an exploratory analysis of the political style of the Romanian Social Democratic 
Party (PSD), which despite being a mainstream centre-left party, has shifted from a latent to a 
crystalized populist rhetoric. Using qualitative content analysis of party speeches and press 
statements from 2015-2019, the article shows how the political style of the party becomes more 
populist when the domestic justice system begins to pressure leading PSD politicians. The data 
reveal an intersection between populist rhetoric and institutionalist discourse when PSD is 
trying to amend the rule of law institutions. 
 
 
































Among the various approaches to the study of populism, the notion of populism as a ‘political 
style’ has grown in recent years. Driven by authors like Moffitt (2016), the notion of ‘political 
style’ has examined how political leaders employ populist themes as part of their strategies of 
mobilisation and governance. In turn, this perspective leads very smoothly to a second, recently 
growing scholarly domain: discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2008). This theory explores 
how institutions change through discursive constructions that specific actors create and 
employ. With this theoretical framework and the proposed interpretative case study, this article 
seeks to contribute to the growing body of populism and its relation to judicial issues (c.f. 
Blokker, 2019; Mazzoleni & Voerman, 2020; Sadurski, 2020). To do so, this article analyses 
the interaction of these two phenomena in the case of Romania. Hence, this study asks how 
populist political discourse affects the structure of democratic institutions? To provide insights 
vis-à-vis when and how does populist discourse matters, this paper analysed the particular case 
of the largest and most successful mainstream party, i.e., the Social Democratic Party (PSD).  
During a period in power from 2015 to 2019, PSD noticeably amplified its populist 
political style and used this discourse in a series of attempts to alter judicial institutions. This 
study presents a coded database of more than 600 public statements and speeches from PSD 
leaders (most notably its leader, Liviu Dragnea) collected from the 2015-2019 period. The data 
is collected from the official YouTube page of the PSD, transcribed, and then coded and 
analysed via a dictionary and qualitative content analysis. The results reveal the evolution and 
rise in populist tropes used by different PSD leaders. Concomitantly, the article will examine 
how this discourse was employed to undertake several moves, often via emergency government 
decrees (OUG), to circumscribe the judiciary and specific institutions of the rule of law. As a 
third analytical focus, the paper explores how spikes in populist political style were often 
precipitated by moves made by judicial institutions to investigate PSD leaders. Overall, the 
study highlights how a cycle of struggle between populist leaders and the rule of law 
institutions prompted the former to use discourse to affect the institutional structures of the 
latter. To explain this correspondence, this study looks at the path of populist discourse in 2015-
2019 in Romania. 
Next, the conceptual framework first presents the type of populism. Then, it outlines 
the concept of discursive institutionalism. Subsequently, it succinctly introduces in conceptual 
terms the kind of democratic institutions this study examines and presents explanations about 
why rule of law institutions specifically might be noteworthy to look at when they are 
confronted with populist discursive practices.  
  
 
Populism – a political style 
 
Despite scholars conceptualising populism through an ideational approach (Mudde & Rovira 
Kaltwasser, 2017) or a strategy (Weyland, 2001), one particular approach has gained ground, 
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which focuses on the communicative and performative elements of populism (Sengul, 2019, p. 
91). Previously, scholars have noted that populism encompasses particular stylistic elements 
(Canovan, 1999) that were tailored to a communicative dimension (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). 
Hence, Sengul (2019) argues that the study of populist communication is important for two 
reasons. First, Kriesi argues that ‘populist ideology manifests itself in the political 
communication strategies of populist leaders’ (2014, p. 364), while Waisbord values the arena 
of political communication as a struggle between ‘popular truth and elite interests’ (2018, pp. 
27-29). By understanding how the communication mechanisms and discursive strategies of 
political agents take form and change, one can appreciate an essential dimension of the populist 
phenomenon.  
This study contributes to this body of research and supports Moffitt’s thesis (2016, p. 
16), who views political style as ‘the repertoires of embodied, symbolically mediated 
performance’. Previously, populism as a political style was discussed in the works of 
Ankersmit (2002), Hariman (1995) and Pels (2003). Their work influenced Moffit (2014, p. 
387) who reviewed the political style as ‘focusing on the performative elements of the 
phenomenon, thinking of populism as a political style that contextualises populism’s position 
in the contemporary ‘stylised’ political landscape and brings representation to the forefront of 
discussions about populism’. Moffitt’s approach, Sengul argues, (2019, p. 92) ‘offers a 
minimalist definition which has versatility, allowing for comparative analysis across the 
ideological spectrum’. Moffitt envisages the following key concepts: ‘the people’ versus ‘the 
elite’; the emphasis of ‘bad manners’ in the speech of populists and the performance of ‘crisis’ 
(2016, p. 45).  
The operationalisation of populism includes, herein, four categories. The first three are 
‘the people’ opposing ‘a form of elite’ often via ‘bad manners’, whereas the fourth stipulates 
the existence or engineering of a ‘crisis’. The existing literature which has examined ‘the 
people’ (Canovan, 1999; Espejo, 2017) and the ‘elite’ (Helbling et al., 2016) is vast. However, 
this study argues that ‘the people’ represent a democratic ideal element that populists count on 
in political debate (Moffitt, 2016). Müller (2016, p. 21) argues that the message of populists 
assumes that ‘only some of the people are the people’. This stylistic selection fashions a societal 
antagonism between two opposing camps. The populists separate society by speaking on behalf 
of the people on the premise that they ‘really know’ that they are the best to represent the people 
and their interests; and by challenging the expertise and ‘common sense’ of the bureaucrats 
and technocrats (Moffitt, 2016, p. 52). Equally, populists construct discourse around the values 
of the people, who act as a moral cushion when discursively separating ‘the elite’. Žižek (2006, 
p. 555) considers ‘the elite’ to be the opposite of the ‘people’ and contends that populism 
‘displaces the antagonism and constructs the enemy’ which is ‘externalized and reified into a 
positive ontological entity whose annihilation would restore balance and justice’. Hence, the 
elite is used in discourse as that minority whose institutional power prevents ‘the people’ from 
attaining progress while abusing their democratic rights. Frequently, the elite is associated with 
a conspiratorial creed in populist discourse.  
Silva et al. (2017) noticed a correlation between the belief in conspiracy theories and 
populist discourse, which perceives ‘the people’ as victims at the hands of ‘elites’. Similarly, 
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this study indicates that populist discourses construct conspiratorial beliefs and associate the 
elite’s modus operandi to the current suffering of ‘the people.’ Elsewhere, Chiruta (2020) 
observed an association in the populist discourse between belief in conspiratorial views (e.g., 
deep state), memory issues, and elite. Populist discourse takes a more clearly defined form 
when the anti-elite is stylistically defined. This depends upon specific political circumstances, 
which separate a perceived ‘enemy’ from the party’s struggle to reform society in the name of 
the people. Once the ‘anti-elite’ is defined as the opposite element, the agents add a ‘crisis’ to 
represent a prejudice created by ‘the elite’ in the eyes of ‘the people’. 
Thus, the populists create a crisis to bridge the gap between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’. 
Scholars have argued that without signalling a crisis, one cannot speak of populism (Laclau, 
2005). Attempts to analyse the discourse of ‘crisis’ have been proposed successfully by 
Krzyżanowski (2019). Unlike previous contributions, this article wants to explain how past and 
emergent ‘crises’ of democratic institutions are rhetorically incorporated and operationalised 
as democratic crises; ones that populists want to change through a connexion of populist and 
institutionalist discourse. Moffit (2016) has shown the value of the political style in the context 
of South America, specifically Peru, where populists amend institutions. Recently, Moffitt 
(2020) reminded about the usefulness to use the political style to analyse cases of populism 
from Australia and Venezuela. Bonikovsky and Gidron (2016) have shown the benefits of the 
political style when analysing American elections. Others analysed how Syriza tampered with 
the courts from Greece (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). Similarly, this study wants to use 
the same analytical lenses for Eastern Europe’s politically unstable and ideologically lacking 
milieu, to explain how populists use discourse to change democratic institutions. To avoid 
confusion, this study refers to democratic institutions strictly in the judicial sense, i.e., courts 
and investigative bodies. 
Furthermore, ‘bad manners’ are revealed as the way political actors degrade political 
discourse, disregarding ‘appropriate’ modes of acting in the political realm (Moffitt, 2016, p. 
52). It has been argued that ‘bad manners’ are particular to the case of reference. Moffitt (2016, 
p. 52) argues the elements that constitute ‘bad manners’ are the use of slang, swearing, and 
being overly demonstrative. Nai and Coma (2019) showed that colourful elements could be 
identified in the speech of a leader as populist markers. Populists likely espouse specific 
linguistic traits, depending on the socio-cultural context. Hence their use is meant to have ‘great 
political and cultural resonance (Moffitt, 2016, p. 52). These bad manners are accentuated when 
a populist agent is pressured by external factors.  
Sengul (2019) asks how different categories of political style can add knowledge vis-
à-vis the adoption of populism? First, Ekström et al. argue that this is done by ‘providing a 
context-sensitive, analytical procedure for examining how populist discourse draws on 
linguistic tropes and discursive practices as resources within specific socio-cultural contexts’ 
(2018, p. 3). Second, Ekström et al. maintained that the elements of political style offer ‘crucial 
insights into how populist politicians mobilise stylistic resources to discursively produce and 
display their difference from mainstream ‘technocratic’ political discourses’. (2018, p. 3) 
Third, one can add that style may reveal the elements behind the causes that foster the adoption 
of populism. Herein, the style refers to different etiquettes and protocols by which a language, 
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determined by specific socio-cultural circumstances, is used by an agent to create a 
communicative act, a discourse.  
In his study, Moffitt (2016) highlighted cases of populist politicians who used the 
political style to ascend to power. But what happens when agents who became populists in 
office use the political style to circumvent the state institutions that prevent them from power-
grabbing. How and what will the agent communicate to that extent? How will the agent in 
office intersect populist discourse and discursive institutionalism to subvert the rule of law? 
Below, this paper assumes the concept of discursive institutionalism as an essential component 
to the repertoire of populists in power. It does so to explain that discursive institutionalism does 
not embody and represent just ideas. Adequately, discursive institutionalism stresses that one 
should look instead at what the interactive processes of discourse of the agents produce, to 
explain the political and social reality of a given society. Thus, discursive institutionalism can 
assume the dynamics of policymaking of populists in power if the procedures are supported 
and strengthened during rallies via populist discourses and conspirational theories. Through a 
series of three vignettes, this paper displays, towards the end of this paper, the ability of populist 
agents to interconnect populist rhetoric and discursive institutionalism to undo technocratic 
policymaking, subvert the judicial institutions via power through ideas, and support these 




Discursive institutionalism  
 
This article adopts the work of Vivien Schmidt (2008) on discursive institutionalism (DI) and 
combines it with the political style of populism. The theoretical proposition of this study 
merges the political style’s repertoire of symbolically mediated performances with DI’s 
interactive processes of communication and contestation implemented in the political arena by 
populist leaders and their parties. This approach may generate new insights vis-à-vis how or 
why rule of law institutions might be specifically noteworthy to look at when they are 
confronted with the populist discursive practices of particular agents in power. The significance 
of power in DI’s framework is essential when looking at what populists do when they assume 
office. Here, this paper finds Schmidt’s (2008, pp. 306-309) conceptualisation of DI as power 
through ideas indispensable when understanding the modus operandi of populists. Primarily, 
power through ideas, combined with a populist repertoire, might persuade audiences of the 
cognitive validity and normative ideas that the populists espouse through the use of discourse. 
Second, Schmidt’s (2008, p. 307) power through ideas outlines the configurations vis-à-vis 
how populist agents attempt to enforce and dominate the meaning of ideas in a given society. 
Taken together, the power through ideas – in a politically unstable milieu – can transfer the 
monopoly on public discourse from elites (Schmidt, 2008, p. 315) (e.g., technocratic and 
institutional) to, in this study case, populist agents. 
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Schmidt argues that discourse ‘is not just ideas or ‘text’ (what is said) but also context 
(where, when, how, and why it was said). The term refers not only to substance (what is said, 
or where and how) but also to agency (who said what to whom)’ (2008, p. 305). The central 
framework of Schmidt’s approach is embodied by institutions. Schmidt defines institutions as 
‘simultaneous structures and constructs internal to agents whose ‘background ideational 
abilities’ and ‘foreground discursive abilities’ make for a more dynamic, agent-centred 
approach to institutional change’ (2008, p. 305). In conventional political discourse, 
institutions are epitomised as rational, objective and neutral settings whose purpose is to help 
streamline societal issues. By contrast, the discourse of populist agents strives to remove the 
objective nature of institutions by denoting them as individual decision-makers in their 
relationship with the audience. These viewpoints of populists convey to the people that 
institutions present a bias, thus needing reconfiguration. These repertoires include a logical 
basis and reasoning that identifies the problem while informing society of the solutions required 
for it. As Schmidt (2008, p. 314) puts it: 
 
 
[D]iscursive abilities represent the logic of communication, which enables agents to think, speak, and 
act outside their institutions even as they are inside them, to deliberate about institutional rules even 
as they use them, and to persuade one another to change those institutions or to maintain them. And 
it is because of this communicative logic that DI [dis- cursive institutionalism] is better able to explain 
institutional change.   
 
 
Schmidt claims that communicative discourse, which aims to persuade audiences of change, is 
uttered by ‘political leaders and government spokespeople [which] communicate the policy 
ideas and programs developed in the coordinative discourse’ (Schmidt, 2008, p. 310). These 
agents are usually the ones who want institutions to change. Others have adopted DI’s claim 
that ‘discursive institutionalism has a bias for change [thus being] well-attuned to analyse 
emerging processes of change’ (Dawson & Hanley, 2019, p. 6). For changes to happen, a crisis 
is required that justifies the measures proposed by the agent to their audience in order to patch-
up institutional flaws. Political agents endeavour not to ‘repair and strengthen the institutions, 
but above all, to change the cadres’ (Krygier, 2019, p. 564). Usually, altering institutions 
requires two types of strategy. The first speaks of political agents ‘formulat[ing] and 
reformulate[ing] strategies practically’ (Dawson & Hanley, 2019, p. 5), while the second 
mentions ‘ideological entrepreneurs’(Schmidt, 2016, pp. 330-331). These two approaches ‘not 
only make sense cognitively but also resonate in terms of norms and values that give them 
legitimacy’ (Dawson & Hanley, 2019, p. 5).  
Legitimacy is sought by agents before the process of changing institutions. A 
meaningful communication grants the agent much-needed legitimacy. The communication 
‘serves not just to represent ideas but also to exchange them through the interactive processes 
of a) coordination among policy actors in policy and program construction and b) 
communication between political actors and the public in the presentation, deliberation, and 
legitimation of those ideas, against a background of overarching philosophies’ (Schmidt, 2008, 
pp. 321-322). The envisioned reform seeks to measure the level of ‘institutionalised sources of 
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attachment, resentment attitudes to public institutions, but they also seek to revive, develop, 
shape, distort, and exploit’ (Krygier, 2019, p. 562). The language of populists is employing 
cognitive and normative ideas. The first reveals ‘how policies offer solutions to the problems 
at hand, how programs define the problems to be solved and identify the methods by which to 
solve them’ (Schmidt, 2008, p. 307).  
Meanwhile, normative ideas ‘attach values to political action and serve to legitimate 
the policies in a program through reference to their appropriateness’ (Schmidt, 2008, p. 307). 
A similar configuration occurred in Romania between 2017-2019, when the largest party, after 
gaining a parliamentary majority, used discourse to change rule of law institutions that 
consolidated the anti-corruption reforms. Below, this study sketches the types of rule of law 




The rule of law institutions and the Romanian politics 
in 2015-2019 
 
This study argues that populists perceive rule of law institutions and the ‘political elite’ (who 
protect those institutions) as obstacles. These bodies restrict the power-grabbing of populists, 
who often first look to alter the judiciary to operate unchecked. Scholars ascribe this set of 
practices as an attempt ‘to revive the true rule of law, build it anew’ (Krygier, 2019, p. 566). 
This study wants to contribute to the growing literature on populism in relation to law and 
judicial issues (c.f. Blokker, 2019; Blokker & Mazzoleni, 2020; Sadurski, 2020). The analysis 
of this case study relates to the judiciary dimensions.  
Scholars that analysed case studies from Western Europe explain the strategies different 
populist leaders and parties employ when both the former and the latter tend to pit their 
communities of voters against the rule of law (Mazzoleni & Voerman, 2020). Often, specific 
populist agents and parties attack the rule of law in the name of popular and national 
sovereignty, as opposed to the liberal-constitutional values (Plattner, 2010). Frequently, the 
efforts of specific populist agents and parties to limit the autonomy of judiciary are determined 
by opportunist views and constitutional perspectives (Mazzoleni & Voerman, 2020). One case 
in particular is the period of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) from Romania in 2015-2019. 
During this time, specific populist agents emerged and limited the autonomy of the judiciary. 
Unlike other studies that focused on cases of right-wing parties (Kosař et al., 2019), the present 
case study is focusing on a mainstream and centre-left party from Romania that pivoted towards 
right-wing populist discourses in the attempt to subvert the rule of law. The present case study 
analyses the trajectory of the largest and most powerful political party, i.e., PSD to populist 
discourse and populist constitutional-making. 
Romania is a specific case whereby populists clashed with judicial institutions, 
especially after its entry into the European Union. For all those who took control of major 
industries and amassed fortunes illegally after the fall of Communism (see Gallagher, 2005), 
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the EU’s principle of the rule of law represented a threat, especially if enforced by specific 
institutions to combat corruption. According to Krygier (2019, p. 572), the rule of law, although 
being an abstract concept, can be understood as a system of values that comprises the 
institutional integrity of significant institutions that temper power-holding via constitutional 
courts and civil society organisations. The rule of law can best be acknowledged when populists 
attack one or all its values. 
Before and after its accession into the EU, Romania’s democratic institutions were 
weakened by a web of clientelist networks, which controlled their functioning and widened the 
level of corruption (Mendelski, 2012, pp. 23-24). Hence, a number of independent judicial 
institutions like the National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA) together with the High Court 
of Cassation and Justice (HCCJ) and the institution of a Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism (CVM), a mechanism designed to observe and maintain reform developments, 
were seen fitting by the EU to reform the judiciary and prevent corruption (Hoxhaj, 2019, p. 
114). Despite the European Commission strategies to dent corruption, public NGOs in 
Romania consider that the judiciary is lacking integrity and independence (Vaduva, 2016, pp. 
4-24). The EU’s commitment to strengthen these institutions in Romania made parties attempt 
to amend the values of the rule of law for their benefit. In later years, part of the political 
strategy was to weaken the two independent institutions that make up the case of this study, 
i.e., how does populist political discourse affect their structure. This study assesses the means 
by which discourse affects the institutions of the rule of law, e.g., DNA and HCCJ.  
The DNA was created, at the behest of EU, during the tenure of former president Traian 
Băsescu to dent corruption and increase the rule of law (Mendelski, 2012). In 2013, Băsescu 
placed Laura Codruța Kövesi in charge of the DNA, whose tenure is considered as a success 
(MacDowall, 2016). In one report, the European Commission admitted that the DNA and the 
HCCJ ‘established an impressive track record in terms of solving high and medium level 
corruption cases’ (2017). In time, the DNA produced many high-profile convictions, which 
gained praise in the region (Carp, 2014; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2018). However, the sizeable budget, 
growing personnel associated with the numbers of prosecutions and the DNA’s modus 
operandi are seen by some legal scholars as focusing on results at an accelerated rate (see 
Hoxhaj, 2019, p. 140; Mendelski, 2020). This acceleration backfired in 2017-2019, as 
Romania’s largest party, i.e., Social Democratic Party (PSD) won the 2016 election by a 
landslide, inevitably ‘push(ing) to relax the fight against corruption and to remove the head of 
DNA’ (Hoxhaj, 2019, p. 140). The PSD felt threatened the most, as many members were 
indicted for corruption by the DNA and convicted by the HCCJ. Mungiu-Pippidi argues that 
PSD is more corrupt than other parties because they were in power more since the fall of 
Communism (2018, p. 108). Despite the fact the CVM superintended the independence of the 
judiciary, this did not stop PSD from attacking the judiciary. 
In respect to Central and Eastern Europe, scholars agree that the ‘rule of law reversals 
have occurred in novel forms, most surprisingly and deeply in Hungary and Poland’. (Krygier, 
2019, p. 546). Following the regional pathology spearheaded by Hungary’s FIDESZ and 
Poland’s PiS against the rule of law (Ágh, 2018), PSD overhauled the judiciary (Falasca et al., 
2016). Praised initially as a much need victory of the left’s pragmatism, in the wake of right-
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wing parties’ success in Europe (Paun, 2016), PSD’s victory promptly destroyed the public’s 
expectations. Though failing in 2012 (c.f. Tismaneanu, 2013), PSD’s newest attacks against 
the judiciary proved successful, as these somewhat imitated the procedures of FIDESZ and 
PiS. Like its CEE counterparts, PSD undermined the country’s constitutionalism through its 
parliamentary majority (c.f. Kelemen & Pech, 2019; Tćth, 2017), packed the Supreme Court 
and lower courts with loyalists, and challenged the forms and rhetoric of law (Krygier, 2019). 
Nonetheless, unlike PiS and FIDESZ, the case study of PSD is unique, as the latter is a 
centre-left party, unlike its right-wing counterparts. Thereby, PSD is not ideologically 
motivated towards adopting populism; instead, its purpose is pragmatic, i.e., to ensure members 
evade prosecution. PSD’s chairman, Liviu Dragnea, and other leaders were such individuals – 
hence the rush to subvert the judiciary. PSD’s deep-rooted conflict with President Iohannis and 
abuse of Emergency Ordinances (OUG) to circumvent the presidential powers also played a 
role. The unique usage of these normative acts, alongside a populist discourse, brought amnesty 
and pardons for corruption charges, banned President Iohannis from naming judges and the 
heads of the HCCJ, and established a Special Section to investigate magistrates. All of these 
ordinances bypassed parliamentary debates and oversight committees. Together with a populist 
vocabulary, these normative acts were designed to safeguard Dragnea and PSD cronies 
troubled by DNA’s indictments or HCCJ’s convictions. But how did a centre-left party come 
to wield enough pressure upon the judiciary? 
For three decades, PSD has been ‘the party of power’ in Romania (Bernhard & Kubik, 
2014, p. 26). A direct descendent of the Communist party (Ciobanu, 2015), PSD consolidated 
its status as Romania’s largest and disruptive political force (Gallagher, 2015). Its vast party 
machine, which never lost a parliamentary election, handled by a web of clientelist networks, 
local barons and other cronies, fortified its longevity and overall political success.  
However, in 2014-2015, PSD’s political hegemony suffered two setbacks, which 
subsequently led to the accession of a strongman that redefined the party in 2015-2019. First, 
the election in 2014 of Klaus Iohannis from the National Liberal Party (PNL) as the president 
of Romania (Gherghina, 2015), beating the then PSD leader Victor Ponta, ushered the rise of 
Dragnea. Second, the Colectiv Nightclub fire from 2015, an incident that killed 64 people, 
prompted massive street protests (Creţan & O’Brien, 2019) and the emergence of civil society 
parties like the Save Romania Union (USR). These events led to the collapse of the Ponta 
premiership and the instalment of a technocratic government run by Dacian Cioloș, a former 
European Commissioner (Brett, 2015). Consequently, these episodes reshuffled PSD’s 
organisation, paving the way for the election of Dragnea. The appointment of Dragnea as 
PSD’s chairman, despite having a criminal record, was puzzling.  
In no time, Dragnea revised the party’s code of conduct and doctrine to appeal as a 
modern social-democratic party. Drawing on a pro-European and pro-NATO platform, 
emphasising economic reforms and social justice, PSD won the 2016 parliamentary elections 
in a landslide (45%). Oppositely, PNL, the second-largest party, endorsed by President 
Iohannis, yielded unsatisfactory results (20%), while USR took 8% and People’s Movement 
Party (PMP) 5%, respectively. Subsequently, Dragnea formed a coalition with the Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats (ALDE) (5.56%), the party of Călin Popescu Tăriceanu, another 
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indicted politician and UDMR (6.18%), the Hungarian party – a conventional member of all 
governments (Nedelcu & DeBardeleben, 2016).  
The ensuing political struggle between Dragnea and President Iohannis generated by 
the former’s legal issues, pursued by the judiciary, facilitated the appeal of populism onto the 
political scene. Dragnea’s criminal record, which in 2016 included a conviction for electoral 
fraud and an indictment for abuse of public office, entrenched the party, in the spirit of Hungary 
and Poland, as a populist constitutional-maker (Suteu, 2019). 
 The first step after PSD took control was to ‘modify the Penal and Procedure Codes 
under a pretext of fixing the problem of overcrowding of prisons in Romania’ (European 
Commission Report, 2016). These modifications allowed ‘former politicians not serve their 
full sentences […] and prevent any investigations made against the current government on the 
basis of corruption’ (Hoxhaj, 2019, p. 140). Shortly after, the biggest protests in Romania’s 
history ensued (Adi & Lilleker, 2017). Facing opposition from the judiciary and the protests, 
PSD’s rhetoric gradually embraced populism and pursued what scholars called the ‘pathology 
of the region, i.e., illiberalism’ (Suteu, 2019). Entrenched, PSD began a struggle to discredit 
the judiciary. 
Inside parliament, PSD worked to fill the Constitutional Court and other bodies like the 
Superior Council of Magistracy with associates, relied on the Ombudsman’s prerogatives to 
further alter the judiciary under the pretext of upholding human rights for felons and proposed 
several Emergency Ordinances (OUG) to reconfigure the judiciary. OUG are normative acts 
adopted by Romanian governments when facing urgent requirements. This study discusses 
three critical OUGs. First, OUG 13/2017 decriminalised corruption offenses. OUG 90/2018 
introduced a Special Section to investigate prosecutors, which eventually led to the removal of 
Kövesi from the DNA in 2018. OUG 7/2019 amended: a) the Status of Judges and Prosecutors; 
b) the organisation of the judiciary; c) the Superior Council of Magistrates. The fallout from 
these actions almost triggered the full weight of Article 7, a European Union procedure that 
suspends certain rights, like voting, for a member state (Eder, 2019). Outside parliament, the 
PSD’s discourse adopted a bizarre concoction that accommodated two of Romania’s post-
Communist unresolved problems: a) the inheritance of former Securitate structures (The 
Romanian Secret police) (Chiruta, 2020); b) reforms of the judiciary demanded by the EU rule 
of law values.  
The success story of Romania’s anti-corruption bodies such as the DNA, which secured 
hundreds of convictions, nonetheless backfired into ‘a culture of anti-corruption political 
populism […] leading to open conflict between members of political parties and the judiciary’ 
(Hoxhaj, 2019, p. 144). The leading example that pursued a conflict with the judiciary, delayed 







Qualitative content analysis of 625 press statements and speeches 
 
This study examines the populist political style’s changes on democratic institutions in 
Romania. Specifically, it uses the case study of an entire party’s populist discourse in 2015-
2019, when PSD challenged the forms and rhetoric of law. This study is a disciplined, 
interpretative case study, as it takes existing conceptual frameworks (e.g., the political style of 
populism and DI) and applies them in the case of PSD, which under the leadership of Liviu 
Dragnea, attempted to change the judicial institutions through discourse. The reasons for 
selecting this case study rest on some unique features. First, the PSD’s discursive populism 
levels were special for a combination of both, (a) their absolute levels during elections, (b) their 
sharp increases during indictments and convictions of Liviu Dragnea and other PSD prominent 
members. Second, this is a study of an entire party’s populist discourse, not just (as if often the 
case) that of a single populist leader. This is the study of an entire party that changed its 
leadership during political crises caused by infights with the judiciary. The limitations of this 
interpretative cases study rest on the short timeframe adopted for this study (e.g., 2015-2019) 
and its lack of comparisons with almost similar cases studies from Hungary (e.g., FIDESZ) and 
Poland (e.g., PiS). The generalization of this case study draws on specific implications and 
contributions of rich insights vis-à-vis the mechanism that turn centre-left parties towards right-
wing populist discourse. Also, it deals with an understudied aspect in the literature of populism 
and discursive institutionalism, and it applies it to the case of a radicalized mainstream party, 
i.e., PSD. Thus, this paper asks how populist discourse changes the structure of democratic 




This paper uses a wide-ranging corpus of discursive material (625 press statements and 
speeches). Data was collected from the official YouTube channel of PSD. All videos uploaded 
by the admin were selected for analysis (October 2015 and December 2019), except political 
ads and videos under 120 seconds, due to their discursive inconsistency to layer an interactive 
process of communication (DI). The dependent variable (rule of law institutions) was identified 
based on how the Emergency Ordinances were used or when other retributive steps were taken 
by PSD (e.g., former Ministry of Justice, Tudorel Toader notified the Constitutional Court 
when President Iohannis did not dismiss the head of DNA). YouTube was chosen because it 
shows the performance of politicians in front of audiences, PSD’s rhetorical fluctuations over 
time, especially when adopting populist themes in line with the different charges brought by 
the judiciary, and rhetorical variations during leadership change, such as when Viorica Dăncilă 
replaced Dragnea, following his conviction (Paun, 2019). 
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Apart from PSD’s high-ranking members, this methodology also considered ‘the 
leaders as the focus when it comes to the study of populism’ (Moffitt, 2016, p. 60). The data 
covers four election campaigns. The transcription started with PSD’s Congress (2015), when 
Dragnea became the leader, to show the changes in populist rhetoric in challenging democratic 
institutions. The data were collected between October 2019 and February 2020. The 
transcription was conducted with Google’s voice typing tool, which enabled the researcher to 
transcribe 200,913 words in Romanian. The level of precision for each transcription was then 
re-examined manually to include or add necessary punctuation and to adjust the words that 
were misspelled or misunderstood during the recordings. 
 
Establishing categories for coding 
 
The coding of the discourses was conducted manually according to the categories ‘the 
people’, ‘crisis’, ‘the elite’ and ‘bad manners’ in four columns. To ease the difficulty of coding 
manually, a dictionary-based analysis was employed that was specific to populist terms (c.f. 
Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016). The latter were determined after reading the transcripts of four 
major PSD conferences in 2016-2019. The dictionary contained the patterns of words that 
underline populist linguistic traits. 
 
A) ‘The people’, included ‘us/we pronouns’, ‘the people are sovereign’, ‘the people gave 
us power’, ‘the love of the people’, ‘not respecting the will of the people’, ‘the vote 
given to us represents the power the people have given to PSD’, ‘the people have 
expressed their will, ‘the party that is coming from the people’,  
B) the ‘crisis’ included: ‘cuts to salaries and pensions in 2010’, ‘2012 freezing of salaries 
and pensions1’, ‘democratic crisis’, ‘human rights abuses’, ‘overcrowded prisons’ and 
‘persecuted people’. 
C)  ‘The elite’ included ‘they/their pronouns’, ‘their president’, ‘their government’, 
‘technocrats’, ‘securiști’ (e.g., plural for people who worked for the former Securitate), 
‘Securitate’, ‘foreign companies’, ‘Soros’, ‘the EU’, ‘bureaucrats’. 
D) ‘Bad manners’, The PSD incorporated Soros myths and symbolism (c.f. Kalmar et al., 
2018) to designate paid protesters as ‘Sorosiști’, #hashtagiști, or #hashtagRezist (for 
those who organised online the protests against the OUGs) (c.f. Adi & Lilleker, 2017); 
technocrats and members of the opposition as ‘Sorosiști’, ‘lazy and stupid’, ‘gang of 
marauders’, ‘mafia’, ‘traitors of the country’ and prosecutors as ‘Securiști’ and 
‘torturers’. Bad manners also included other linguistic traits that designate the president 
Iohannis as a ‘tyrant; unpatriotic; dictator; evil; extremist; the enemy; Nazi 
concentration camp chief’. 
 
                                                 
1 Following the Greek crisis in 2009, Romania’s debt reached an alarming 10 billion euros in 2010. After 
negotiations with the International Monetary Fund, the then liberal government of Emil Boc secured a 19 billion 
dollar loan, which was backed by austere policies including cuts of 25% to salaries and 15% to pensions in 2010 
and policies that froze the pensions and salaries of public servants in 2012. 
 14 
The purpose of this logic is to determine the populist themes that shape the contexts of the 
populist-institutionalist worldviews used by PSD’s leadership to challenge democratic 
institutions. The rationale behind this logic considered that the high-ranking officials’ 
discourses uttered and performed in front of PSD members during different time-periods are 
grounded on the developments of indictments and convictions of its leader. Therefore, these 
discourses are likely replicated and further developed in other speeches and press statements 
for its electorate and broader audiences. 
 
Affixing code values to discourses 
 
Methodologically, this paper separated the coding process into four columns, according 
to the four categories of the political style, red for ‘the people,’ yellow for ‘crisis,’ blue for 
‘anti-elite,’ and grey for ‘bad manners.’ The unit of analysis are sentences. After the 
transcription, the study coded only the sentences comprising the linguistic traits of populism. 
For instance, speeches which focused on substance, unlike statements which focused on policy, 
included a greater abundance of sentences that could be coded. The stylistic format of the 
speeches granted leeway to develop one’s narrative around the four categories of the political 
style and attack the judiciary. Based on the model of Bonikovski and Gidron (2016), the study 
incorporates simple numeric codes to indicate the presence and absence of populist content. 
Before coding, the study considered the hypothesis of Muis and Immerzeel (2017), who argue 
that all political discourses include a certain degree of populism. To represent PSD’s slide to 
populism when attacking the judiciary, this study assesses the numeric codes given by each 
speech and statement. It does so to represent the value distribution of the pieces of discourse 
(N=625) and the transition to populist discourse for each category across time. 
So, for cases when the presence of populist content was visible, the study is coded 
according to its category and numerically from 1-4, depending on the various references within 
the discourse. Concurrently, there were few cases when all four categories were encountered, 
and multiple references of populist content coded. Absence was coded as zero. There are two 
manners to calculate the distribution of populist values and the transition of each category. The 
distribution of populist values is calculated horizontally (left to right), depending on the colour 
affixed to the boxes from the four columns. Whenever one or all categories of the populist 
political style were encountered in a discourse, the box designating the category was coloured. 
This measurement has the function to calculate how many categories of the populist political 
style are encountered in discourses and how frequent these are employed in the rhetoric. 
Depending on the length, considering Dragnea’s and Tăriceanu’s indictments and convictions, 
and PSD’s Emergency Ordinances, the pieces of discourse had zero, one or up to four 
categories of populism coloured in the four columns.  
Consider the speech of PSD’s junior coalition partner, Tăriceanu (ALDE) who utilized 
during the rally against the parallel state (June 2018) a double anti-elite construction, enforced 
by one reference of bad manners. Thus, “the Securitate of Communism has not diet but 
transformed itself and wants back in power […] Traian Băsescu (ex-president) created the new 
Securitate (e.g., the DNA) and Klaus Iohannis (e.g., incumbent) maintains it. And their 
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executing tools are Kovesi (ex-head of DNA) and Coldea (ex-head of Romanian Intelligence 
Service (SRI).” Herein, the dual structure of anti-elite is reflected by the chronological order 
layered by Tăriceanu’s discourse. The former president Băsescu created the DNA and 
strengthened the judiciary, while the incumbent Iohannis preserved the structure of the DNA 
and defended the independence of the judiciary. Subsequently, the logic is reinforced by 
references that stipulate how this new Securitate is imposed. Herein, Tăriceanu utilized bad 
manners via “executing tools.” Thus, this speech was coded as follows. For the distribution of 
values, the boxes affixed to the categories “anti-elite” and “bad manners” were coloured with 
blue and grey, respectively. Additionally, the squares affixed for this speech were coded with 
the number of references per category (2 – anti-elite and 1 – bad manners) and later used during 
the calculation for the transition of each category of populism. In a comparative example, 
consider the speech of Dragnea from Galati during the 2016 local elections: “We (e.g., PSD) 
love the people […] we are represented by two thirds of Romanians, by millions of Romanians. 
The opposition is not. They are like a mob group.” Herein, Dragnea positioned stylistically the 
people against the opposition, who is pejoratively characterized as moblike. Again, this speech 
has two categories coloured: yellow for the sovereignty of ‘the people’ and grey for ‘bad 
manners’. Given the nature of public statements, the frequency of populist content was 
restricted. For instance, the day after Dragnea organized the rally against the parallel state, PSD 
held a press conference in which Dragnea espoused only pressed by reporters that “the Parallel 
State needs to be crushed.” For this press statement, the “anti-elite” category was marked with 
blue, and the affixed code given was 1. 
 The transition of PSD towards populist discourse is measured differently from the 
distribution of populist values. The transition is determined by vertically (top-to-bottom) 
counting the codes of each individual category of the political style. The different frequency 
numbers obtained after the speeches and statements of each month in 2015-2019 were coded 
are attributed to its designated values ranging from 0 to 4. The resulting codes ascribed to 
values 4 and 3 account for the high rates at which PSD used populist tropes to change the 
judiciary. Contrarily, values 0 and 1 represent the lower rate, whereas value 2 exemplifies a 





The development of PSD’s populist discourse during Dragnea’s era and 
the catalysts that propelled its crystallization   
 
In total, the research analysed 625 individual pieces of discourse, comprised of 243 
speeches and 382 press statements. The analysis revealed a preponderance of two or more 
categories contained within speeches rather than in statements, despite the latter encompassing 
more data (see FIGURE 1). Differences between the two categories reveal the importance that 
PSD attributed to its discourse when intersecting populism and DI. Also, the analysis revealed 
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a higher frequency for the distribution of values 0, 1, and 2 and a lower frequency for values 3 
and 4. Two conclusions may emerge presently. First, PSD’s rhetoric prove the Muis and 
Immerzeel hypothesis (2017) that all political discourses include a certain degree of populism, 
as PSD’s discourse maintained a somewhat average degree of populism, with occasional spikes 
when being pressured by the judiciary. Second, the PSD perceived populism as an opportunity 
that already yielded results in CEE in its fight against the rule of law institutions. Consequently, 
the PSD wielded populism for purely pragmatic self-interests, rather than ideological purposes. 
Next, the paper gives insights about the frequency distribution of populist content from 
speeches and statements. Further, this paper indicates indictments and convictions to be the 





Frequency distribution of populism in PSD’s discourses 
 
Speeches contain the most populist rhetoric, thereby focusing on the substance. PSD’s 
press statements cover policies, thereby focusing on the DI’s interactive processes of 
communication, deliberation and contestation. The lower incidence of populist rhetoric in 
statements corresponds to the hypothesis of Muis and Immerzeel (2017), which proposes that 
all discourses have a degree of populist content. The incidence of populist rhetoric in speeches 
has a double meaning. First, speeches were mainly used during party conventions and rallies. 
Therein, the performance of the speech reduces the social distance between the electorate and 
the agent, enabling the former to comprehend the meaning given by the latter. Second, the 
occurrences of this style denote the focus given by the agent to an unmediated communication 
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by watchdogs, who otherwise flag the agent’s shifts towards populism. Also, speeches offer 
more time for the agent to convey their message and build the image of the antagonist. Equally, 
speeches allow additional stylistic leniency to divert from conventional speech-making, to an 
unorthodox style whereby the agent includes bad manners to represent institutions and 
opponents subjectively. The results of the value frequency distribution from Figure 1, for 
speeches, underscore a more even display in populist discourse in electoral years (2016-2019). 
This finding could stress the role played by election campaigns as a corresponding 
factor that shifted the PSD’s discourse to populism. Speeches account for the most varied 
distribution of all values, particularly during 2016 and 2019, both electoral years. Statements 
account mostly for the 0, 1 and 2 values in 2016-2019. Two exceptions are highlighted in 2018 
and 2019 when statements reveal value 3. Nonetheless, the overriding distribution series is 0, 
which might suggest the focus of PSD on policy proposals to communicate, deliberate, and 
contest the rhetoric of law. Between 2017 and 2018 there is a steady rise, generated mainly by 
OUGs procedures. Value 1 is the second most frequent value, which indicates an even 
distribution of 25-30 points. Value 2 gained traction after 2018 and in 2019 in both speeches 
and statements, when Dragnea reacted to the indictments against him. Value 3 is revealed with 
regularity in speeches made during electoral years, predominantly in 2016 (11 points) and 2019 
(22 points). Finally, value 4 is seldom found. However, its frequency is notable in the electoral 
years and during the Parallel State rally from June 2018. Overall, the frequency distribution of 
all values suggest that populism and DI intersect and partly overlap when PSD moves from 
musing over the biases of the rhetoric of the judiciary to the point of contestation of the rule of 
law institutions through populist discourse. 
 
 
Transition to populist discourse 
 
In the following, figures 2-5 include all the incidents across the four categories of 
populism as a political style that are then broken down by category in the trajectory graphs that 
follow. In this light, the reader can notice, for instance, how the transition of the PSD to 
populism was defined by Dragnea’s indictments and convictions. The further indicted Dragnea 
became, the more the PSD demonised the judiciary as the former Securitate (Ceaușescu’s 
former Secret Police) and the greater the PSD contested the rule of law through the power of 
ideas, the more the PSD changed the institutions through normative ideas. Surprisingly, the 
populist momentum was retained and developed during the tenure of Viorica Dăncilă, albeit 
with some changes. Dăncilă abandoned the contestation of the judicial institutions, following 
Dragnea’s incarceration in 2019 and due to pressure from civil society.  
 
Rendering the ‘elite’ vs. ‘the people’ in PSD’s discourse 
 
In 2016-2019, PSD primarily focused on rendering the ‘elites’ as those who keep rule 
of law institutions unreformed, like populist literature suggests, to the people’s detriment 
(Ekström et al., 2018). Analysis of the data revealed ‘crisis’ to be the second most used 
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category. Both the 2016 and 2019 employment of crises identify, as in the literature of 
populism, the failure of post administrations (c.f. Moffitt, 2016, p. 126). In 2018, the populist 
discourse spiked after the HCCJ convicted Dragnea for incitement to abuse. As this conviction 
was pending appeal, the discourse of the PSD elevated the use of ‘bad manners’. The latter was 
used consistently during Dăncilă’s campaign against President Iohannis. Although ‘people’ are 
a passive element of the PSD discourse, this category is employed twofold. First, when the 
PSD is facing internal political turmoil, the party appeals to ‘the people’ to re-validate its 
empirical representativity. Second, ‘people’ is used as a moral buffer to oppose the 




The analysis reveals that ‘the people’ (see Figure 2) is only showcased during election 
campaigns or when the PSD is facing internal disorder between the cabinet and Dragnea to 
push forward OUG13/20017. In the frequency analysis, ‘the people’ during election periods 
constitute the second most determined category of all four values. ‘The people’ are rendered 
within discourse not to embody a precise idea, but rather to act as a measurement value when 
assessing the morality of the elite. The dynamics of ‘the people’ transitioned yearly, from being 
the manifesto’s centrepiece to signifying an empirical argument that granted legitimacy to 
address democratic crises. Dragnea reconfigured the party’s doctrine and code of conduct, 
putting ‘the people’ at the centre of its actions. In his inauguration speech, Dragnea discursively 
connected the values of ‘the people’ to the PSD: 
 
 
‘It is time to say clearly who we are. It is time to say why we are in politics. And we must start with the 




Across 2016, ‘the people’ were discursively connected against the ‘anti-elite’. In 2017, the 
appeal to ‘the people’ was performed as two PSD governments were deposed, i.e., Sorin 
Grindeanu (January-June) and Mihai Tudose (July-October) which did not want to proceed 
with the changes to the judiciary mandated by Dragnea. Between the two, the PSD performed 
a discourse that was appealing to the people as it was seen to revalidate the representativity of 
the party (see Figure 2 May/July 2017). Again, in 2019, after Dragnea was convicted and the 
PSD lost the European parliamentary election, the party shifted its discourse towards ‘the 




The discursive dichotomy of ‘the people’ vs. ‘the elite’ was used during the local 
elections (May 2016) and parliamentary elections (December 2016) (See Figure 3). When the 
PSD is in power, its discourse links ‘the elite’ with the past and impending ‘crises.’ For 
example, during the European election, the PSD coalesced ‘the elite’, as being embodied by 
the opposition parties. During March and May of 2019, the analysis recorded the biggest pool 
of populist references during Dragnea’s time (25 instances), primarily explained by the 
impending final verdict in Dragnea’s trial. During the European elections campaign, Dragnea 
referred to the political elites as ‘traitors of the country’ (2019d). Additionally, Dragnea utilised 
a Eurosceptic discourse; ‘we wanted to join the EU for a better life, for more freedom, not to 
go back to fear and terror’ (Gurzu, 2019). Overall, the frequency of the anti-elite category is 
the most encountered in the distribution of the discourse, encompassing two-thirds of all codes. 
Nonetheless, the greatest prevalence of ‘anti-elite’ was after each indictment and 
conviction of Dragnea. Between November 2017 and August 2018, Dragnea is indicted for 
fraud and convicted for abuse (see Figure 3). Each prosecution is followed by spikes in ‘anti-
elite’ rhetoric, equating the prosecutors as the ‘Securitate’, while contesting the decisions of 
the rule of law institutions. This is also the case for the RISE Project investigation into money 
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laundering. The populist discourses are backed shortly thereafter by PSD’s power through ideas 
(Schmidt, 2008), i.e., normative acts. The OUGs are adopted when populist discourse contracts 
but revived between the OUG 90/2018 and OUG 7/2019. The former reacted to Dragnea’s 
indictment for fraud, thereby removing Kövesi, the DNA’s chief prosecutor, and instituting a 
Special Section to investigate prosecutors. OUG 7/2019 reacted to Dragnea’s conviction for 
abuse, thereby amending the status of judges and changing the organisation of the judiciary. 
This finding could validate the thesis of this study, i.e., after each prosecution, the intersecting 
sequence between populist discourse and DI changed the judiciary in Romania. 
The attacks on the judiciary throughout OUG 7/2019 forced the European Commission 
to threaten Romania on 13 May with article 7, a procedure that suspends certain rights. 
Consequently, the discourse against ‘the elite’ grew in intensity and only dwindled after the 
lost election (see Figure 3). On 26 May, Dragnea was imprisoned and PM Viorica Dăncilă was 
selected as the new leader and presidential candidate for the elections. 
Although expecting a decrease, the research discovered that Dăncilă’s populist appeal 
surpassed Dragnea’s frequency while campaigning for the November 2019 election. The 
analysis of frequency distribution discovered that during Dăncilă’s tenure the discourse had its 
most even distribution of all four populist categories in speeches (see Figure 1). After 
appealing to ‘the people’ for revalidation in July-September, Dăncilă’s rhetoric mixed ‘the 
elite’ and narratives of ‘crisis’ with nationalism, by stressing the rhetorical element of 
‘Romanian heart’ to distinguish President Iohannis’s German ethnicity. 
 
 
‘I am convinced that within our hearts lies a Romanian heart who will work for Romanians and Romania’ 
(Dăncilă, 2019a) ; and ‘It is our fight to have a president with a Romanian heart who will think and feel 
as a Romanian.’ (Dăncilă, 2019b).  
 
National populists, existing literature suggests, ‘prioritise the culture and interests of the nation 
and promise to give voice to a people’ (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018, p. 8). The PSD focused on 
stressing the ideological distance between ‘the people’ and President Iohannis, while struggling 
to reclaim national values.  
 
The recurrence and utility of the ‘crises’ in PSD’s discourse 
 
In terms of the ‘crises,’ under Dragnea, this category was utilized differently. First, it 
framed the Cioloș’s technocrat government during the local and parliamentary elections as an 
extension of the liberal party (PNL), which cut and froze the salaries and pensions during 2010 
and 2012, respectively. As an illustration, during his Medgidia speech, Dragnea framed the 
liberals “[…] I am reminding the audience about how the soulless PNL cut the salaries in 2012. 
I remind the people how many people lost their jobs.” (2016d) The 2012 crisis is a recurrent 
theme in the PSD’s rhetoric. The same is employed during Dancilă’s tenure more astutely. 
Second, in some discourses, PSD framed the crisis from the agriculture in 2016 to correlate 
technocratic austerity. Between March 2016-November 2017, the analysis revealed a relatively 
high number of discourses that framed the ‘2012’ crisis and, to a lower degree, that from the 
 21 
agricultural sector. Other crises revealed by the coding analysis were the means of PSD to 
signal both human rights and democratic crises in the wake of Dragnea’s conviction for abuse 
(see Figure 4). The coding frequency of ‘crisis’ was registered high between May-July 2018, 
and approximately at the same level as during the elections from 2016. This high rate is 
explained by the rhetoric employed before and during the rally against ‘the parallel state’ on 




The rhetoric during this rally combined the categories ‘anti-elite’ and ‘crisis’ to signify 
a democratic crisis perpetrated by the judiciary. For instance, Dragnea framed the democratic 
crisis as follows: 
 
 
‘We have all been, or are, or I could be at some point touched by the long hand of this parallel state; of 
these Securitate guards (e.g., DNA). There are 6 million people who were intercepted, tracked, 
monitored, recorded, and supervised by the parallel state. It's worse than we could have ever imagined. 
Look at the one on your left, look at the one on your right. At least one of them was heard or 
intercepted. That may have been likely to be you among the six million Romanians whose rights and 
freedoms have been violated. 6 million - over two thirds of the active population of this country. It is 
too much, it is unacceptable, it is intolerable!’ (2018b). 
 
Combined with the ‘anti-elite’, ‘crises’ may have prepared the ground for later adoption of the 
OUGs which intended to mitigate the overpopulation from prisons and amend the sentences 
for those convicted for abuse in office. For instance, this democratic crisis is best employed by 
Dragnea’s coalition partner Călin Popescu Tăriceanu from ALDE who argues during the same 
rally that “The Romanian state is threatened by the parallel state which has infiltrated in the 
judiciary and mass media. […] Thousands of people fell victims to the new system of Securitate 
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(e.g., DNA)” (2018b). Again, before the European elections from May 2018, Dragnea, while 
still the chairman of PSD, employed the ‘2012 crisis’ and ‘the judiciary crisis’ in the rhetoric. 
As an example, during PSD’s conference from Ialomița, Dragnea (2019c) argues that “they 
(e.g., PNL and technocrats) cut the salaries and pensions, and brought austerity and economic 
decrease. Until 2017 (i.e., the tenure of technocrats ended, and PSD started) in Romania 
functioned Omerta. They do not want to speak about the poverty of Romanians, about how 
elections are rigged in the dormitories of the new Securitate. PSD has the courage to speak.” 
Conversely, after Dragnea was sentenced to jail, Dăncilă’s repertoire readopted the 
‘economic crisis’ that echoed ‘2010 and 2012’ and amplified them beyond Dragnea’s level to 
outline the consequences of a new President Iohannis tenure. Between October and November 
2019, the analysis coded the highest frequency of sentences that employed crisis (i.e., 22 
instances). During this period, Dăncilă utilized the same structure, i.e., emphasis on the crisis 
and demonization of Klaus Iohannis. For instance, during a speech in Tamasi, Bacău county, 
Dăncilă contended that “we have seen how they (e.g., PNL) cut the salaries and pensions. They 
do not do anything good. Everything they do is for austerity […] and this could happen again 
with Iohannis” (2019e). Other times, while associating ‘the elite’ with crises, Dăncilă validated 
her credentials by proposing ways to avoid such a crisis. The complete removal of ‘the people’s 
evil enemy is revealed as the only way out of the crisis created by ‘the elite’ (Moffitt, 2016, p. 




‘To secure the future of this country, we all need to participate during the elections. We need to vote 
for our families. I know that here, (e.g., Dofteana) you are good Romanians. So, good people, in 
November, the fight is against Klaus Iohannis, his people and the Romanians who want their country 
back. […] We need a President to represent us with dignity abroad, who will work for Romanians and 
Romania, and not for one who is taking his orders from Brussels’ (2019d). 
 
‘Bad manners’ and the art of coarsening the public discourse 
 
Indications of the PSD’s ‘coarsening [of] the essence of the political discourse with bad 
manners’ (Moffitt, 2016, p. 53) became evident during the anti-Parallel State rally, when the 
frequency was high. ‘Anti-elites’, ‘crises’ and ‘bad manners’ were utilised after Dragnea was 
convicted for abuse and may have formed the base of the discourse that changed the DNA and 
the status of the prosecutors (see Figure 5). For example, during the rally against the parallel 
state the former head of the DNA Laura Codruța Kövesi was called by Tăriceanu as an 
“executing tool”, whereas Dragnea called the prosecutors “Securiști” and the DNA “a vile 
brotherhood […] that wants to take down democracy” (2018b).  
‘Bad manners’ was also used more astutely during the European elections to portray 
the opposition as ‘traitors,’ ‘fascists,’ and ‘enemies of Romania;’ and prosecutors as ‘torturers’ 
and ‘Securiști’. As an illustration, the analysis coded a high frequency of sentences that 
included ‘traitors,’ ‘fascists,’ ‘enemies of Romania,’ ‘torturers,’ and ‘Securiști’ before the 
European elections and his subsequent trial. For instance, during his campaign speech from 
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Caraș-Severin, Dragnea argues that “Securiștii (e.g., prosecutors) created new parties (e.g., 
USR and Plus+) to hold on the power […] this is the parallel state, a state police of terror” 
(2019b). Later at Călărași, Dragnea argues that “the anti-corruption fight is led by some 




Unlike Dragnea, Dăncilă espoused ‘bad manners’ when referring to President Iohannis. 
She used epithets like ‘tyrant’, ‘dictator’ and ‘extremist’ to separate Iohannis through linguistic 
symbols from ‘the people’. Equally, Dăncilă’s discourse focused on strengthening the nature 
of her political mission ‘we need to stop this dictator president who has brought Romania to its 
knees’ (2019f) . Dăncilă used the fear of past crises and attached these to President Iohannis. 
Dăncilă’s speeches constantly reiterated Iohannis as ‘unpatriotic and lazy who will have a 
government in his image, which will bring back austerity’ (2019c). Dăncilă stressed a national 
mission alongside ‘the people’ to save Romania from the ‘evil Iohannis’: 
  
 
‘I will fight to save Romania from the most toxic president Romania has ever had – a president who 
fought against his government, who turned against its people, who refused human rights. We have a 
duty to save Romania from the evil Klaus Iohannis’ (2019a). 
 
The ‘elite’ and ‘crisis’ discourses were the most used by the PSD in 2015-2019. Overall, the 
particular ramping up of populist discourse, shown between March and August 2018, 
intersected with DI’s contestation and power through ideas may have prepared the ground or 
foreshadowed changes in democratic institutions. The figures 2-5 include all of the incidents 
across the four categories of populism as a style that were broken down by individual category 
in the above-mentioned figures. Next, this study discusses the role of elections campaigns and 




Indictments, convictions, elections are catalysts of populism 
 
Data analysis found that indictments and convictions constitute the most critical factors 
that contribute to a more definite form of the populist style. To explain the full frequency of 
populist political style within the PSD during this period, we also need to examine the party’s 
interactions with moves made by the rule of law institutions.  
 During his chairmanship, Dragnea was indicted and convicted six times. Each time 
Dragnea was indicted or convicted, the populist narrative spiked for a time, followed by a stage 
when the PSD interconnected DI as a retort to the prosecutions. Whenever the populist 
narrative grew, the categories revolving around ‘the elite’ increased, mainly because PSD’s 
discourse framed political and technocratic institutions as being behind the prosecutions. Such 
a populist spike was caused, for example, when HCCJ issued Dragnea with a two-year 
suspended sentence for electoral fraud on 22 April 2016. Thereafter, Dragnea focused on 
winning the parliamentary elections grounded on populist discourses that depicted technocrats 
as the puppets of Iohannis and the PNL. 
In November 2017, the DNA indicted Dragnea for fraud based on information compiled 
by the European Anti-Fraud Office. Each prosecution fostered populist rhetoric, especially in 
2018 when Dragnea was accused of money laundering in Brazil as a result of investigative 
journalism (see Figure 5). Similarly, on 21 June 2018, Dragnea was convicted by the HCCJ 
for incitement to abuse. Prior to Dragnea’s conviction, the PSD and its allies organised rallies 
that fostered populist narratives to intimidate the prosecution and muster public support, which 
the research investigates in the third vignette. The discourse interconnecting the categories of 
the elite included statements such as ‘generals attack democracy through political parties and 
NGO which are financed illegally’ and the utilisation of ‘bad manners’ to frame the system and 
agents who were seen to be acting against the PSD chairman – ‘not only high ranking people 
are the victims or can be victims of the parallel state, but all of us […] this is a plan of terror 
which says that everyone can be indicted’ (Dragnea, 2018b). Interestingly, the analysis 
revealed that during consecutive indictments and the release of OUGs, the PSD’s discourse 
excluded the category of ‘the people’, opting instead to frame ‘the elite’ with the use of ‘bad 
manners’.   
Each populist spike intersected with DI is usually caused by Dragnea’s consecutive 
prosecutions. Coincidently, Dragnea’s indictments are publicised before elections. 
Consequently, PSD contests each conviction of Dragnea with an OUG. According to the 
analysis, the discourse utilised by the PSD framed the ‘elite’, as ‘that minority’ who impeded 
the reforming actions ‘we cannot live with the dictatorship of the minority’ or ‘Kövesi is more 
important than the Constitution’ (Firea, 2018). Election campaigns were another factor that 
fostered populist style. Given the hyperbolic nature of the populist political style, it is no 
surprise to see that the levels go up right before an election, since elections lend themselves 
precisely to these kinds of emotional, rhetorical appeals  
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After showing a sequential evolution of the PSD’s populist style and DI, the study 
presents three vignettes that go into greater detail regarding the nature of populist political 
style; and how it subsequently became linked to change in the rule of law institutions through 
OUGs. The vignettes are individual sub-case studies. These will allow for more empirical 
details originating from the coded analysis to be revealed. 
 
 
The technocrat cabinet 
 
On 10 November 2015, over 100,000 people protested in Romania. Triggered by the Colectiv 
nightclub fire, which resulted in 64 fatalities, the protests led to the resignation of the Ponta 
cabinet. President Iohannis nominated Dacian Cioloș, an EU Commissioner, to run a 
technocratic cabinet. Early on, the technocrats were perceived by the PSD as circumventing 
the power of parliament.   
The main priority of the new cabinet was judicial reform. Kosař et al. (2019) argue that 
by endowing a technocratic cabinet to repair the issues of technocratic institutions, i.e., the 
judiciary leads ‘to populist overreaction, which swung the pendulum back to the other extreme 
by re-politicising of the public sphere […] curtailing and packing the unelected institutions, 
particularly the judiciary’ (p. 430). Raluca Prună, the justice minister, was tasked with 
reforming the judiciary after the CVM report stressed that more reform was required. On 11 
March OUG 6/2016 reformed the laws of interception, whereby the Romanian Intelligence 
Service (SRI) was permitted to conduct investigatory acts. Also, it promulgated that 
prosecutors and the DNA were the only to execute technical supervisory mandates regarding 
corruption, using directly and independently the infrastructure of the SRI. 
Consequently, OUG 6/2016 played a pivotal role in PSD’s pragmatic tilt to populism. 
In April, Prună vexed the PSD by extending the mandate of Kovesi at the helm of the DNA 
and by proposing Augustin Lazăr for the General Prosecutor’s office. These two individuals 
were the main targets of the PSD in their bid to amend the judiciary. However, as Romania 
was recovering from the Colectiv nightclub fire, where demonstrations signalled that 
‘Corruption Kills!’, using judicial reform as an electoral slogan was not an option. Instead, the 
PSD revived its interests after the local elections in May 2016.  
PSD’s populism was honed after the HCCJ sentenced Dragnea on 22 April 2016. Two 
days later, in a statement, Dragnea considered his trial illegal. PSD’s rhetoric condemned the 
PNL and the technocratic cabinet of engineering political prosecutions. The day after, Dragnea 
blamed the technocrats for adopting OUG 6/2016, which affected the judiciary, mentioning 
that ‘these are not backed by political convention’ (2016a). 
After his conviction, Dragnea returned to campaigning by adopting a recurrent 
discourse that underlined the ‘incompetence and stupidity’ of the technocrats. While peppering 
his speeches with bad manners, Dragnea separated ‘the people’ and ‘the technocrat-elite’ by 
underscoring their social distance and national values – ‘they do not love their country and 
Romanians, […] PSD loves Romania and cares about its people’ (2016a). Moffit argues that 
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the language of populists is opposed to technocratic language (2016, p. 52). Technocratic 
language is singled out, by Dragnea, during a speech on 19 September 2016: 
 
 
‘We do not understand this reasoning because Mr Cioloș did not speak in Romanian. He used the 
language of technocrats, a language that sounds foreign, and a language that is not anchored in reality’ 
(2016e). 
 
Throughout the local elections, Dragnea highlighted the crisis in the agricultural sector, 
underlining the asymmetric values of the technocrats and accusing them of ‘incompetence and 
stupidity’, (2016b, 2016c) as opposed to Iohannis’s description, ‘competence and acumen.’ 
Throughout the campaign, the PSD stressed the lack of political representativity between the 
technocracy and ‘the people’, by contrasting this with the shared values of ‘the people’ and the 
PSD. The focus of the discourse shifted towards issues of rule of law before the election. In his 
Medgidia speech, Dragnea outlined that ‘the fight against corruption is good, but it cannot feed 
people’ (2016d). In September, Dragnea stressed the need to repeal OUG 6 because he argued 
it violated the human rights of the inmates imprisoned following the prosecutions of DNA and 
HCCJ.  
Before the parliamentary election, the PSD fabricated another ‘national crisis’, which 
suggested that the technocrats have a ‘plan to sell the country to foreigners’, allowing them to 
purchase dividends (Toma, 2016). Simultaneously, the PSD’s discursive strategies adopted the 
tenets of the Soros myth from Hungary’s FIDESZ (c.f. Kalmar et al., 2018). This narrative 
stressed a ‘foreign power-grab of national values’ facilitated by technocratic policies. Dacian 
Cioloș was framed by PSD and its friendly media in conspiracy theories as the son of George 
Soros and as someone with links to the former Securitate. Later in 2018, Dragnea stated, 
without evidence, that Soros had tried to assassinate him (Clej, 2018). Following the party’s 
victory during the parliamentary elections of 2016, the PSD subsequently sought to undo the 
projects of the technocratic cabinet via OUGs and connect its actions and some members (e.g., 
Dacian Cioloș) with the mechanisms of a parallel state / deep state. 
 
 
The Emergency Ordinances (OUG) 
 
On 31 January 2017, at midnight, the PSD adopted the Emergency Ordinance OUG 13/2017. 
Hours later, the streets roared with legions of protesters. In the days ahead, Romania witnessed 
its biggest protests since the fall of Communism.  
The normative act OUG 13/2017 decriminalised previously chargeable corruption 
offenses while complicating the prosecution of certain corruption violations, including graft 
and abuse of office, offenses, for which, unsurprisingly, Dragnea was convicted. Hitherto, the 
PSD discarded electoral populism and adopted an interactive process of communication and 
contestation of the judiciary (DI). The frequency of their statements highlighted the urgency of 
addressing the human rights crisis in prisons. Throughout the time the PSD enacted OUG 13, 
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Dragnea restated its validity as received from the people: ‘we have received the trust of the 
people for four years, so let us govern’ (2017a). On 1 January, the then justice minister Florin 
Iordache justified the emergency by stating the existence of an ongoing human rights crisis in 
overpopulated prisons, generated by the prosecution rates of the DNA. Iordache stated that ‘the 
government will need to rectify this’ (2017) and later in 2018, after OUG 90, he said that ‘it is 
necessary to abolish the abuses of those in certain institutions’ (2018). 
Eventually, massive protests and pressure from civil society led to the repeal of OUG 
13/2017 days later. The future defence of OUGs framed the resistance as an illegitimate fight 
against legitimate authority, substantiated by empirical representativity. This and the fallout 
from the protests pushed PSD to design the tenets of the ‘Parallel State’ that allegedly 
mobilized the youths to protest and abetted the institutions to deny PSD’s reforming actions 
(see more in the next section - The ‘Parallel State’). Essentially, PSD’s DI was designed to 
bypass ‘regulatory institutions’ (Dawson & Hanley, 2019, p. 3). It legitimised the PSD’s 
institutional actions by presenting a logic that persuaded the people of their ‘legitimacy to 
change institutions’ (Schmidt, 2008, p. 314). The DNA’s high budget and the frequency of 
convictions (Mendelski, 2020), was branded to have been a bias against PSD. The coincidental 
arrival of each indictment of Dragnea days before the election campaign encouraged the PSD 
to contest the DNA, by enacting OUGs to shield its leader. The inadequacies of a system 
highlight an institutional crisis, which political agents are keen on exploiting. Subsequent 
convictions strengthened the necessity for the PSD’s leadership to bypass regulatory bodies, 
especially after the DNA indicted Dragnea for fraud. Scholars have pondered that the 
avoidance of regulatory institutions is creating authoritarian hybrid regimes (Ágh, 2016). 
Others deem such measures as processes of democratic backsliding (Dawson & Hanley, 2019, 
p. 3) through executive aggrandisement (Bermeo, 2016). 
 Throughout 2017, Dragnea would suffer many obstructions, including from PSD-run 
cabinets, which succumbed to EU pressure and refused to assume OUGs (Paun, 2017). 
Previously, Dragnea’s recurrent defence of the projects was based on policies, which 
channelled a deterrence of democratic crises by refashioning the judiciary. On 10 May, 
Dragnea spindled the crisis from prisons to abuses committed by prosecutors: 
 
 
 ‘We try to solve the problems the judiciary has, which we have spoken about for months. We need to 
solve the abuses of prosecutors and the conditions of detentions’ (2017b).  
  
Dragnea’s discourse sought to accentuate the party’s past points of contestation. He underlined 
the need to address the judiciary’s malfunction by reconfiguring its structure. 
 
 
‘I do not want to become complicit with the forces who do not want to reform democracy and who do 
not respect the votes of millions of Romanians’ (2017b).  
 
The language of the PSD’s policy is meant to suggest that reform is for both curbing the crisis 
of democracy and for the people’s benefit. Subsequently, the semantics of the PSD’s DI 
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included the parameters of their proposed policy; one that limited the judiciary’s modus 
operandi. After Dragnea was convicted in 2018 for incitement to abuse, his time was limited 
until 27 May 2019, a day after the European elections. In no-time, the policies of the PSD 
added the DNA to the logic of the democratic crisis. Hence the PSD agreed to a ‘setup [of] 
democracy by cutting down abuses of the DNA’ (Dragnea, 2019e).  
 Over the course of five months, the PSD adopted OUG 90/2018 and OUG 7/2019 (see 
Figure 5). For the former, Dragnea stressed the image of those responsible for the crisis ‘there 
are red lines drawn by those who violate human rights and the constitution for the sake of 
prosecution’ (2019a). The parameters of institutionalist defence included a more ample 
justification of its necessity; ‘OUGs were needed because the judiciary breached fundamental 
laws such as human rights and the Penal Code’ (Dragnea, 2019e). In this sense, the PSD did 
what legal scholars argue as ‘the moment when populists erode the rule of law casting the 
benefits of the bill to the people while using the same one to hamstring democracy’s 
institutions’ (Krygier, 2019, p. 566). PSD’s policies were designed to validate societal 
perception vis-à-vis their contestation of the judiciary. Their philosophy is designed to make 
ordinary people see public institutions not as abstract structures but as discursive configurations 
that breach human rights. One manner adopted by PSD was to develop and preserve the 
narratives that spoke about a ‘Parallel State’. The latter jeopardized people’s human and 
democratic rights. For instance, OUG 7/2019, which amended the judicial system the most was 
abetted beforehand by a rhetoric that portrayed both the prosecutors and judges as the 
underlings of a ‘Parallel State’. Despite condemnations from civil society and international 
organisations, OUG 7/2019 was adopted.  
 After OUG 7/2019, the EU Commission threatened Romania with Article 7. These 
events take shape against the backdrop of the MEP elections, in which the OUGs were justified 
by the existence of a ‘Parallel State’. PSD attacked the opposition and showcased 
Euroscepticism when defending the OUGs in front of its electorate. Romania’s adherence to 
Schengen is tightly linked to reform of the judiciary, which, in turn, is validated by the CVM 
report. Herein, Dragnea started spreading misinformation to its electorate by arguing that 
Romanians ‘are being lied not to adhere to Schengen. There is no connection between our 
admission to the Schengen Area and the rule of law’ (2019g). Following the European election, 
the PSD obtained their lowest electoral results, (only 22%) in twenty-nine years, indicating that 
their policies against the judiciary backfired at the polls. The HCCJ settled on appeal the next 
day on the verdict for incitement to abuse. Subsequently, PM Viorica Dăncilă became PSD’s 
new leader. Dăncilă later said in a meeting behind closed doors that ‘the rule of law killed us 
at the vote’. Eventually, Dăncilă discarded the ‘Parallel State’ rhetoric during public speeches 
and refused to reply to questions from journalists about its existence. Even so, the harm was 
achieved. Some PSD friendly news channels like Romania TV and Antena 3 often replicated 
the aforementioned idea in their prime time shows and the public was acquainted to the 
imported notion of a ‘Parallel State.’ But how did PSD decided to introduce this after all? Next, 
I explain that this imported idea was adopted to strengthen and justify the reforming process 




The ‘Parallel State’ 
 
On 17 November 2017, the PSD unveiled a resolution titled Parallel State and Illegitimate. 
This was essentially the PSD’s version of the Turkish (see Söyler, 2015) and United States’s 
‘deep state’ (Michaels, 2017; Stewart, 2020). The resolution claimed that the ‘parallel state’ is 
a hidden force owned by a group of people from public and private institutions, foreign and 
domestic, NGOs, civic groups, secret services and journalists who control, from the shadows, 
via illegal mechanisms, the Romanian state (Ursu, 2020, p. 7). By adopting this resolution four 
days after Dragnea was indicted, this move represented a direct link between indictments and 
populist discourse. 
  In Romania, the ‘deep state’ suffered a linguistic facelift, becoming the ‘parallel state’. 
The nature of how this conceptualisation was adopted in Romania remains undetermined by 
scholars. The PSD in 2017-2019 did not maintained a logical consistency of who and what the 
‘parallel state’ was or is. Ambiguously, the party discursively represented it as both the whole 
judiciary and as something that controls it.  
 Nonetheless, in less than two years, Dragnea would appear, in the words of Kubik and 
Bernhard (2014), as a mnemonic entrepreneur, who brought back the legacy and memory of 
the Securitate and overlapped them with the values of the DNA (Chiruta, 2020, pp. 242-247). 
In 2018, the philosophy of the parallel state nuanced. It equated the judiciary with the 
‘Securiști’ in many speeches. After the conceptualisation of the ‘parallel state‘, the PSD’s 
discourse focused on the action of this supposed ‘state’. Thus, on 29 March 2018, Dragnea 
declared that ‘the parallel state will not stop the process of reconfiguring the judiciary’ (2018a). 
On 6 June 2018, the PSD organised a rally in Victory Square in Bucharest, the site of the 
Romanian revolution. As other studies suggest, PSD’s intention was to recreate the symbolism 
of 1989 Revolution (Chiruta, 2020).  
 In 2019, as the verdict for the abuse trial approached, the populist and conspiratorial 
discourse increased in intensity: ‘we talk about the parallel state, about this structure, this 
system that is resembling a system of political police and terror in Romania’ (Dragnea, 2019b). 
Before the European elections, Dragnea’s discourse focused on associating the memory and 
language used to describe the Securitate with the parallel state: ‘the parallel state is a state of 
terror’ (2019b). As Dragnea’s conviction approached, the PSD’s discourse radicalised and 
projected the reforms envisioned as a liberating force from a system that affected democracy 
in Romania. While campaigning in Iasi, on 20 April, Dragnea argued that the ‘PSD wants to 
free the judiciary from the claws of the Securitate’ (2019f).  
 Overall, PSD’s discourses crystalized its populism by absorbing conspiratorial beliefs 
similar to those from Turkey and the United States about a ‘deep state’ and refashioned them 
to suit Romania’s social and political milieu. Focusing on anti-elitism, PSD equated the the 






This study of the Social Democratic Party from Romania developed a discursive analysis based 
on Moffitt’s conceptualisation of populism as a political style. This study has shown that 
political style is of utility when assessing discourses in a politically unstable and ideologically 
lacking setting like that of Romania. Though not without its limitations, this research has 
incorporated a text analysis and measuring model of the PSD’s performance. The aim was to 
identify the main factors which led the centre-left party to move from latent populism to a 
definite form of populism. Primarily, this research indicated that discursive institutionalism is 
an essential discursive component in the communication logic of populists who strive to change 
the rule of law institutions. This study reveals that political agents when pressured by the 
judiciary adopt a discursive sequence. This relies on populist repertoires to demonize 
institutions, elites and DI’s power through ideas to contest and change the rule of law 
institutions.  
 The findings suggest that PSD presented a somewhat average degree of populism in 
2015-2019 particularly in statements, which focus on policy. Exceptions are the election 
campaigns when the distribution of the four categories ‘the people,’ ‘crises,’ ‘anti-elite,’ ‘bad 
manners,’ are more consistent in speeches because these focus on the substance of populism. 
Likewise, the findings suggest that the transition of PSD to populism was fostered by cycles of 
confrontation with the judiciary. In addition, the findings relate that the most used categories 
of the populist political style across the pieces of discourse are ‘anti-elite,’ ‘crises,’ and ‘bad 
manners’. These were incorporated more often in the sequence populism – DI when changing 
the judicial institutions. ‘The people’ are a stylistic element espoused by the PSD used during 
elections and internal party disorders. 
 Based on the parameters of the vignettes, this research has demonstrated that the 
technocratic response to institutional issues facilitate a populist response. Second, the power of 
normative acts enabled populists to change the judiciary. Third, this research indicated that 
conspiratorial beliefs (e.g., Parallel state and Securitate) are narratives chosen for the socio-
cultural traits of Romania. Their aim is to discursively replace the abstract and rational values 
of the rule of law institutions. 
 As a result of this paper’s findings, two potential follow-ups are advanced. First, I 
suggest a study that compares the strategies used by main parties from Hungary (FIDESZ), 
Poland (PiS), and Romania (PSD) to limit the autonomy of the judiciary in 2015-2020. Such 
an academic endeavour might discover the similarities and differences adopted by the parties 
to curb the independence of the judicial system. Likewise, such a research may have important 
implications for other studies. It can test the assumptions that opportunist views and 
constitutional perspectives are indeed the incentives of populists in office behind their 
motivation to change the judicial system. A second potential follow-up might analyse the 
rhetorical similarities and differences between the attempt of PSD from 2012 and 2017-2019 
to change the judiciary. Such a study can discover what role did the nationalist rhetoric played 
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